Email authentication
The basics are in place but can be hardened.
Authorizes which servers may send mail for the domain
SPF is published but could be tightened.
v=spf1 ip4:35.190.247.0/24 ip4:64.233.160.0/19 ip4:66.102.0.0/20 ip4:66.249.80.0/20 ip4:72.14.192.0/18 ip4:74.125.0.0/16 ip4:108.177.8.0/21 ip4:173.194.0.0/16 ip4:209.85.128.0/17 ip4:216.58.192.0/19 ip4:216.239.32.0/19 ip4:172.217.0.0/19 ip4:172.217.32.0/20 ip4:172.217.128.0/19 ip4:172.217.160.0/20 ip4:172.217.192.0/19 ip4:172.253.56.0/21 ip4:172.253.112.0/20 ip4:108.177.96.0/19 ip4:35.191.0.0/16 ip4:130.211.0.0/22 ip6:2001:4860:4000::/36 ip6:2404:6800:4000::/36 ip6:2607:f8b0:4000::/36 ip6:2800:3f0:4000::/36 ip6:2a00:1450:4000::/36 ip6:2c0f:fb50:4000::/36 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:mktomail.com include:mailgun.org include:_spf.salesforce.com ~allCryptographically signs outgoing mail (best-effort selector probe)
DKIM key published for 3 known selectors.
Tells receivers what to do with mail that fails SPF and DKIM
DMARC is published but not fully enforcing.
v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100; rua=mailto:[email protected]; fo=1:d:sEnforces TLS for inbound mail and prevents downgrade attacks
No MTA-STS policy. Inbound mail can be delivered without TLS.
Receives reports about TLS delivery failures
No TLS-RPT record. You get no reports about failed TLS delivery.
Displays your verified brand logo in supporting inboxes
No BIMI record. No brand logo is published for inboxes.
Checks query live DNS over Cloudflare and the public MTA-STS policy endpoint. DKIM selectors cannot be listed from DNS, so DKIM detection probes common provider selectors only.