Apex, subdomain, or URL. We figure it out.
Results for
qdrant.tech
Email authentication
The basics are in place but can be hardened.
- 2Pass
- 2Warning
- 0Fail
- 2Not set
SPF
PassAuthorizes which servers may send mail for the domain
SPF is published and within limits.
- Policy
- ~all
- DNS lookups
- 2 / 10
- Ends in ~all (softfail): unauthorized senders are marked, not rejected.
- Uses 2 of 10 allowed DNS lookups.
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:139603372.spf04.hubspotemail.net ~allDKIM
Not setCryptographically signs outgoing mail (best-effort selector probe)
No DKIM key found for common selectors.
- Selectors probed
- 32
- DKIM selectors cannot be enumerated from DNS, so this only probes well-known selectors. A negative result is not proof that DKIM is missing.
DMARC
WarningTells receivers what to do with mail that fails SPF and DKIM
DMARC is published but not fully enforcing.
- Policy
- p=none
- Coverage
- 100%
- Policy p=none: DMARC is in monitoring mode only and does not block spoofed mail.
- No rua address: you receive no aggregate reports to monitor abuse.
v=DMARC1; p=none;MTA-STS
WarningEnforces TLS for inbound mail and prevents downgrade attacks
MTA-STS is published but not enforcing.
- Mode
- testing
- Max age
- 604800s
- Policy mode is testing: failures are reported but mail is still delivered.
v=STSv1; id=20250806100000TLS-RPT
PassReceives reports about TLS delivery failures
TLS reporting is configured.
- Reports to
- mailto:[email protected]
- TLS delivery failure reports are being collected.
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:[email protected];BIMI
Not setDisplays your verified brand logo in supporting inboxes
No BIMI record. No brand logo is published for inboxes.
Checks query live DNS over Cloudflare and the public MTA-STS policy endpoint. DKIM selectors cannot be listed from DNS, so DKIM detection probes common provider selectors only.