Apex, subdomain, or URL. We figure it out.
Results for
perl.org
Email authentication
The basics are in place but can be hardened.
- 3Pass
- 2Warning
- 0Fail
- 1Not set
SPF
PassAuthorizes which servers may send mail for the domain
SPF is published and within limits.
- Policy
- ~all
- DNS lookups
- 4 / 10
- Ends in ~all (softfail): unauthorized senders are marked, not rejected.
- Uses 4 of 10 allowed DNS lookups.
v=spf1 include:develooper.com ~allDKIM
PassCryptographically signs outgoing mail (best-effort selector probe)
DKIM key published for 1 known selector.
- Selectors
- Found a DKIM key at mail._domainkey.perl.org
DMARC
WarningTells receivers what to do with mail that fails SPF and DKIM
DMARC is published but not fully enforcing.
- Policy
- p=none
- Subdomains
- sp=none
- Coverage
- 100%
- Policy p=none: DMARC is in monitoring mode only and does not block spoofed mail.
- Aggregate reports (rua) are configured.
v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100; rua=mailto:[email protected]; sp=none; aspf=r; ruf=mailto:[email protected]MTA-STS
WarningEnforces TLS for inbound mail and prevents downgrade attacks
MTA-STS is published but not enforcing.
- Mode
- testing
- Max age
- 1209600s
- Policy mode is testing: failures are reported but mail is still delivered.
v=STSv1; id=20190601000000ZTLS-RPT
PassReceives reports about TLS delivery failures
TLS reporting is configured.
- Reports to
- mailto:[email protected]
- TLS delivery failure reports are being collected.
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:[email protected]BIMI
Not setDisplays your verified brand logo in supporting inboxes
No BIMI record. No brand logo is published for inboxes.
Checks query live DNS over Cloudflare and the public MTA-STS policy endpoint. DKIM selectors cannot be listed from DNS, so DKIM detection probes common provider selectors only.