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Results for
mail.ru
Email authentication
The basics are in place but can be hardened.
- 3Pass
- 1Warning
- 0Fail
- 2Not set
SPF
WarningAuthorizes which servers may send mail for the domain
SPF is published but could be tightened.
- Policy
- none
- DNS lookups
- 1 / 10
- No all mechanism: the record has no default policy for unlisted senders.
- Uses 1 of 10 allowed DNS lookups.
v=spf1 redirect=_spf.mail.ruDKIM
Not setCryptographically signs outgoing mail (best-effort selector probe)
No DKIM key found for common selectors.
- Selectors probed
- 32
- DKIM selectors cannot be enumerated from DNS, so this only probes well-known selectors. A negative result is not proof that DKIM is missing.
DMARC
PassTells receivers what to do with mail that fails SPF and DKIM
DMARC is enforced.
- Policy
- p=reject
- Coverage
- 100%
- Policy p=reject: failing mail is rejected outright.
- Aggregate reports (rua) are configured.
v=DMARC1;p=reject;rua=mailto:[email protected];MTA-STS
PassEnforces TLS for inbound mail and prevents downgrade attacks
MTA-STS is enforcing TLS.
- Mode
- enforce
- Max age
- 86400s
- Policy mode is enforce: TLS is required for inbound mail.
v=STSv1; id=20200303T120000;TLS-RPT
PassReceives reports about TLS delivery failures
TLS reporting is configured.
- Reports to
- mailto:[email protected]
- TLS delivery failure reports are being collected.
v=TLSRPTv1;rua=mailto:[email protected]BIMI
Not setDisplays your verified brand logo in supporting inboxes
No BIMI record. No brand logo is published for inboxes.
Checks query live DNS over Cloudflare and the public MTA-STS policy endpoint. DKIM selectors cannot be listed from DNS, so DKIM detection probes common provider selectors only.