Email authentication
The basics are in place but can be hardened.
Authorizes which servers may send mail for the domain
SPF is published and within limits.
v=spf1 ip4:83.97.92.0/22 ip6:2001:798:3::/121 ip6:2001:798:3::11f ip6:2001:798:3::355 ip6:2001:798:3::1d0 ip6:2001:798:3::1b8 ip6:2001:798:3::1f5 ip6:2001:798:3::1ee ip6:2001:798:3::354 ip6:2001:798:3::1e4 ip6:2001:798:3::352 ip6:2001:798:3::1ad ip4:192.254.125.237 ip4:134.213.195.176 ip4:5.75.167.120 ip4:78.136.10.17 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:servers.mcsv.net include:_spf.google.com include:servers.visitcloud.com include:spf.ssmx.net -allCryptographically signs outgoing mail (best-effort selector probe)
DKIM key published for 2 known selectors.
Tells receivers what to do with mail that fails SPF and DKIM
DMARC is published but not fully enforcing.
v=DMARC1;p=none;sp=none;pct=100;rua=mailto:[email protected];ruf=mailto:[email protected];Enforces TLS for inbound mail and prevents downgrade attacks
No MTA-STS policy. Inbound mail can be delivered without TLS.
Receives reports about TLS delivery failures
No TLS-RPT record. You get no reports about failed TLS delivery.
Displays your verified brand logo in supporting inboxes
BIMI is published with caveats.
v=BIMI1;l=https://geant.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GEANT-BIMI-logo_blue-01.svg;a=;Checks query live DNS over Cloudflare and the public MTA-STS policy endpoint. DKIM selectors cannot be listed from DNS, so DKIM detection probes common provider selectors only.